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Introduction: Non-take-up a social problem?
I Most Western societies provide social assistance for households
that lack the resources to maintain a minimum standard of
living. However, if non- take-up rates are high, whether
anti-poverty schemes are designed adequately is questionable.
I The principles of horizontal justice is violated. Benefits are
often coupled with counseling programs. People miss benefits
and consultation which might increase individual and
societal costs in the long run.
I Nonetheless, non-take up is often not studied systematically or
on a regular basis. However, results from several studies
suggest that non-take-up is present, ranging from 20% to 60%
in many countries of the oecd (Hernanz, Malherbet &
Pellizzari, 2004).
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Theory: Why do people not take up benefits?
I Pecuniary determinants: The expected amount of benefits
and the expected duration of eligibility are important
determinants (Bruckmeier & Wiemers, 2012; Anderson et
al.,1997; McCall,1995).
I Lack of information: Lack of information with respect to the
existence of the program or the eligibility criterias lower take
up rates (Daponte et al.,1999).
I Costs related to the administrative process: If the
administrative procedure takes time and the outcome is
uncertain it deters applications (Van Oorschot,2002;
Neuenschwander et al.,2012).
I Social and psychological costs: Stigmatization and/or
individual attitudes towards welfare programs influences
take-up behavior (Moffit, 1983; Kayser et al., 2000).
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Aims of my study and methods
I In the literature pecuniary factors and information costs are
well studied determinants of take-up behavior. However, if
social costs do influence take-up behavior seams to be
discussed quit controversial, albeit especially for poverty
programs it is essential to know if factors related not to the
degree of need influence take-up.
I Two main goals:
1. New estimation for non-take up of social assistance with
administrative data for Switzerland
2. Test if norms influence non-take-up quotas
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Data
I Because Switzerland has no national law on social assistance
non-take-up estimations are difficult because technical 26
different regime exist that have to be modeled adequately.
I Tax data for the canton of Bern posses detailed information on
income and wealth for all people living in Bern.
I Bern is the second most populated canton with 990’000
inhabitants living in 379 municipalities (2012) with major
urban and rural areas
I Tax data is linked with housing register that allows to build an
household identifier (this is essential!)
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Estimating non-take-up
I I tested for every household in Canton Bern if they would
qualify for social assistance following the rules an official
agency would. I then counted eligible persons and compared it
to official statistics on social assistance.
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Is non-take-up influenced by social norms?
I Stigmatization is closely correlated to not complying to social
norms (Goffmann, 1974).
I Norms, however, vary by social groups.
I It can be hypothesized that in a context, where people are
more benevolently towards social assistance take-up has lower
social costs, while in areas with aversion towards social
assistance social costs are increased.
I I proxy social norms towards social assistance with
parliamentary voting shares. Fivaz (2015) shows that party
profiles in Switzerland with respect to social assistance are
with a strong left-right gap. The social democratic party
(SDP) is strongly in favor of maintaining generous social
assistance benefits. The other end of the left-right pole is held
by the Swiss People’s Party (SPP), for whom the reduction of
social assistance benefits is a prominent issue on the agenda.
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2. Is it just population density?
3. Is it the economic structure?
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Summary & Conclusion
I I combined tax data and official statistics on social assistance
to conduct an administrative data based study on non-take-up
of social assistance.
I I tested the relevance of the stigma hypotheses by proxying
social norms with results of parliamentary votes.
I There is an effect that remains even when controlling for
alternative explanations that might confound the results. This
might be because of three mechanisms:
1. Individuals cannot unify the take-up behavior with their
personal norms
2. Individuals indeed fear stigmatization by others
3. An indirect effect can be presumed to derive from the
administration procedure as social services are organized on
the communal level.
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Thank you for your attention!
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